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Analogies in the Case Law of the Court of Justice EU
Abstract. The article reports on some judgements of the Court of Justice EU concerning analogy, commenting 
them. Passages from the cases OMEL v ONEL, PAGO, GOOGLE, .eu Top Domain, DIOR are quoted. Then the 
question is raised: should it be considered as an analogy or a precedent? Defi nition of the notion “analogy” in 
French, English and German law are compared. The fi rst conclusion is that analogy is understood in different ways 
by lawyers in these Member States of the EU. The second conclusion is that by a Hungarian lawyer’s understanding 
most of the examples quoted are rather precedents than true analogies. Moreover, it is observed that in translations 
identical terms ought to be used.
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Analogies are probably as old as case law itself. More than two thousand years ago in the 
Twelve Tables (lex duodecim tabularum) it was ruled that “If the father sells his son three 
times, the son should get rid of his father’s authority.”1 This seems to be a precedent of 
today’s analogy. In the practice, Roman law, like English law was analogist.2
Going even further, by the Romans analogy was taken over from Greek philosophy.3 
Probably the analogist method was already used at the ancient Greek courts (agora).
I mentioned the above only as introduction. My topic is the case law of the Court of 
Justice EU and I start with a recent case.
1. OMEL v ONEL4
The essence of the case history is that the applicant fi led the term OMEL for registration as 
a mark with the Benelux Intellectual Property Offi ce. The opponent is owner of the 
Community trade mark ONEL, which was registered for almost identical services and he 
opposed for confusing similarity of the younger mark.
The applicant asked, as it often happens, that the opponent provides proof of genuine 
use of his mark in the Community. As the opponent was able to prove use only in the 
Netherlands, the opposition was dismissed by the Benelux Offi ce.
* LL.M. Professor of Law.
E-mail: vida@danubia.hu
1 Si pater fi lium ter venum duuit, fi lius a patre liber esto (Tab. IV. 2. b.) see Pólay¸ E.: A római 
jogászok gondolkodásmódja (The Way of Thinking of Lawyers in Rome). Budapest, 1988, 24.
2 Stein, P.: Logic and Experience in Roman and Common Law. In: Varga, Cs. (ed.): Comparative 
Legal Studies. Alderabat, U.K. 1995, 343.
3 Földi, A.–Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History of Roman Law And Its 
Institutions). 17th ed., Budapest, 2012, marginal 249.
4 C-149/11.
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The opponent appealed the decision before the Tribunal of Gravenhagen. The latter 
decided to stay proceedings and referred for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice EU5 
in respect of the requirements of territorial borders of genuine use of a Community trade 
mark. The question concerned essentially whether a Community trade mark having been 
put to a genuine use in just one Member State, met the standard required by the EU 
Trademark Regulation.6 Art. 15 (1) of the TM Regulation provides that lack of use “in the 
Community” within a period of fi ve years can result that the Community trade mark will be 
revoked. Let me stress that the wording of the TM Regulation says only “in the Community” 
and nothing else.
The laconism of this provision provoked the question for years: which territory is 
necessary concerning the use of a Community trade mark in order that it becomes 
incontestable. The practice of the EU Trademark Offi ce (OHIM) in Alicante was that the 
use in just one Member State should be suffi cient. But some Member States, like Hungary 
or Belgium were not satisfi ed with this practice, moreover many practitioners criticised it 
saying that it was not practical in a European Union consisting of 27 different countries.
It is not surprising that in the procedure of the preliminary ruling there participated not 
only the parties, but also the Governments of the Netherlands, Belgium,7 Denmark, 
Germany, France, Hungary,8 and the United Kingdom, moreover the European Commission 
fi led observations in the written part of the procedure.
5 Anderson, D. W. K.–Demetriou, M.: References to the European Court. London, 2002.
6 Regulation Nr. 207/2009.
7 Summary of the Observations of the Government of Belgium (information from P. Veeze, 
Legal Division, Benelux Intellectual property Offi ce) drafted in the order of the questions raised by 
the Belgian Court to the Court of Justice EU.
 a) Is use in one country always enough?
 NO. The Joint Statement (1993) of the EU Council and EU Commission on interpretation of 
Art. 15 of the TM Regulation is not binding. Genuine use in the Community ≠ in a Member State 
Reference is made to Recitals 2, 4 and 6 of the Preamble of the CTM Regulation and to Art 12 
thereof. The EU has grown since the introduction of the CTM Regulation (27 Member states, 500 mln 
inhabitants). Lots of Small and Medium Enterprises do not need EU wide protection. The Joint 
Statement contain an automatism (use in one Member Sate is enough), which contradicts the principle 
of an EU without borders.
 If not, is it never enough?
 NO. All circumstances must be taken into account.
 If it is never enough, what is needed?
 No answer necessary.
 Should the assessment of genuine use in the Community be done in the abstract, without 
reference to the borders of the territory of the individual Member States?
 YES. In a single EU market, frontiers of the Member States are irrelevant. The Joint Statement 
is in contradiction with this principle, since it implies an automatism (it refers to a Member State). All 
circumstances must be taken into account.
8 Essence of the Conclusions and proposals of the Hungarian Government (para 47 of the 
Opinion)
 a) Sec. 15 (1) of the TM Regulation cannot be interpreted in the way that the use of a 
Community trade mark is successful in that very Member Country. Though in such a situation the 
opposition [Sec. 42/2] or the application for revocation [Sec. 57/2] cannot be refused in the Member 
State where the use of that trade mark was proved.
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Moreover, they attended the Hearing, too, where some of them (like Hungary as well) 
completed the arguments explained in the observations in their speeches.
The Court of Justice EU ruled in its judgement9 that the territorial borders of the 
Member States ought to be disregarded, but listed several circumstances which should be 
assessed.10
Many comments were published on the case: by different authors in Hungary: 
Hegedűs, Gonda and the author of this paper, moreover in Belgium, in Germany, in the 
Netherlands, in the U.K., etc. more than 25 countries.
The Hungarian Intellectual Property Offi ce in his e-mail Newsletter published a short 
report11 on the judgement adding that it greets “as it confi rms the case law of the Hungarian 
Intellectual Property Offi ce, moreover it agrees in its main arguments with the viewpoint of 
the Hungarian Government as explained in the Observations fi led and in speech at the 
Hearing with the Court.”
More important was that OHIM amended his Manual on Proof of Use,12 aligning with 
the statements of the Court of Justice EU.
As this paper seeks to focus on the methods of analogy I limit myself on the relevant 
items of the judgement.
In the considerations it is said:
The Court has also stated that the territorial scope of use is only one of several factors 
taken into account (see Sunrider v OHIM para 76).
That interpretation may be applied by analogy to Community trademarks since in 
requiring that the trademark be put in genuine use, the TM Directive13 and the TM 
Regulation pursue the same objective (paras 30–31).
 b) Sec. 15 (1) of the TM Regulation should be interpreted in the way that relating to genuine 
use the territorial borders of the Member States should be disregarded. Instead of that it should be 
examined whether the trade mark was used in accordance with its essential function within the 
Community.
  For excerpts of the Opinion see: Iparjogvédelmi és Szerzői Jogi Szemle, (2013) 3. in the 
article of Vida S.
9 C-149/11; O. Sosnitza: Anmerkung. GRUR-Int. 2013, 185.
10 The wording of the operative part of the judgement is:
  Article 15(1) of Regulation No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark 
must be interpreted as meaning that the territorial borders of the Member States should be disregarded 
in the assessment of whether a trade mark has been put to ‘genuine use in the Community’ within the 
meaning of that provision.
  A Community trade mark is put to ‘genuine use’ within the meaning of article 15(1) of 
Regulation No. 207/2009 when it is used in accordance with its essential function and for the purpose 
of maintaining or creating market share within the European Community for the goods or services 
covered by it. It is for the referring court to assess whether the conditions are met in the main 
proceedings, taking account of all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the characteristics 
of the market concerned, the nature of the goods or services protected by the trade mark and the 
territorial extent and the scale of the use as well as its frequency and regularity.
11 SZNTH e-Hírlevél of 23 February 2013.
12 OHIM Online Newsletter 04-2013 (26 April, 2013).
13 Directive No. 2008/95.
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Comments
Subject of the Sunrider14 case was an opposition against the application for registration of a 
Community trade mark. Both cases (OMEL v ONEL as well as Sunrider) had to be decided 
in conformity with the TM Regulation. Reference to the TM Directive seems to me only 
strengthening the position taken by the Court. As a result I mean that this reference was not 
for a real analogy as we understand in Hungarian, German15 etc. law. In my understanding 
it was a precedent, or according to the terms often used by the Court of Justice EU in other 
cases “it is a well established case law that…” (il est de jurisprudence constante…).
But it cannot be excluded that under French, English etc. laws the notion precedent is 
broader.
Later the same judgement says:
Account must non less be taken when applying the case law cited in paragraph 29 of 
this judgement16 by analogy to Community trade mark … (para 33)
…whilst it is reasonable to expect that a Community trade mark should be used in a 
larger area than a national mark, it is not necessary that the mark should be used in 
an extensive geographic area for the use to be deemed genuine, since such a 
qualifi cation will depend on the characteristics of the product or service concerned on 
the corresponding market (see, by analogy, with regard to the scale of the use, Ansul, 
para 39 – para 54 of the OMEL v ONEL judgement).
… it is impossible to determine a priori, and in the abstract, what territorial scope 
should be chosen in order to determine whether the use of the mark is genuine or not. 
A de minimis rule, which would not allow the national court to appraise all the 
circumstances of the dispute before it, cannot therefore be laid down (see, by analogy, 
the order in La Mer Technology, paragraphs 25 and 27, and the judgement in Sunrider 
v OHIM, paragraphs 72 and 77 – para 55 of the OMEL v ONEL judgement).
Comments
First I observe that purpose and function of the TM Regulation and the TM Directive are 
different. The fi rst one is provided for sui generis trade marks having effect on the whole 
Community. Contrary to it the TM Directive aims harmonisation of traditional trade mark 
law of the Member States, i.e. of national law in each of the 27 Member States.
Consequently, as from the case law referred, in Ansul the preliminary ruling was 
ordered in view of the request of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, in the La Mer 
Technology in view of the request of the British High Court of Justice (with respect to the 
Sunrider case see the previous comment). As a result, these cases were not decided as 
interpretation of the TM Regulation, but by considering the TM Directive. Applying 
analogy in respect of these two cases could be approved, I believe, by jurists of all the 27 
Member States.
14 C-416/04.
15 In the German version of the judgement one can read instead the word “analogy”: “Bei der 
entsprechenden Anwendung der … angeführten Rechtsprechung…” (corresponding application of the 
referred case law).
16 In paragraph 29 cited, referred are the cases C-40/01 Ansul para 43, C-416/04 Sunrider v 
OHIM para 70, C-259/02 La Mer Technology para 27.
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2. PAGO17
The Community trade mark PAGO is used by an Austrian company for fruit juices and 
reputed in that country. In the infringement procedure against a company residing in the 
same country the Austrian Supreme Court requested preliminary ruling from the Court of 
Justice EU on the extent of the territorial protection of a Community trade mark, which is 
reputed in one country only.
In its reply the Court of Justice EU referred to analogy relating to several aspects of 
the discussed case. Namely:
The relevant public is that concerned by the Community trade mark, that is to say 
depending on the product or service marketed, either the public at large or a more 
specialised public, for example traders in a specifi c sector (see, by way of analogy, 
CHEVY – General Motors,18 para 24, with regard to Article 5(2) of the TM Directive 
– para 22 of the PAGO judgement).
It cannot be required that the Community trade mark be known by a given percentage 
of the public so defi ned (CHEVY – General Motors, by way of analogy, para 25 – para 
23 of the PAGO judgement).
The degree of knowledge required must be considered to be reached when the 
Community trade mark is known by a signifi cant part of the public concerned by the 
products or services covered by that trade mark (CHEVY – General Motors, by way of 
analogy, para 26 – para 24 of the PAGO judgement).
In examining this condition, the national court must take into consideration all the 
relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share held by the trade mark, the 
intensity, geographical extent and duration of its use, and the size of the investment 
made by the undertaking in promoting it (CHEVY – General Motors, by way of 
analogy, para 27 – para 25 of the PAGO judgement).
Territorially, the condition as to reputation must be considered to be fulfi lled when the 
Community trade mark has a reputation in a substantial part of the territory of the 
Community (see, by way of analogy, CHEVY – General Motors, para 28 – para 27 of 
the PAGO judgement).
Comments
The case referred as analogy related to the trade mark CHEVY registered in the Benelux, 
moreover the relating preliminary ruling was ordered following the request of a Belgian 
Tribunal, i.e. based on the TM Directive and not on the TM Regulation. As a result, the 
references to analogy are not unwarranted.
17 C-301/07; before the judgement: von Mühlendahl, S.: CTM Riddles Territoriality and Unitary 
Character. E.I.P.R., (2008) 1, 66; after the judgement: the same in: The Bardehle-Pagenberg IP Report 
2009/IV. 12.
18 C-375/97 CHEVY (owned by General Motors).
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3. GOOGLE19
In the frame of the great variety of his activity, Google presents also advertisements. It 
happened that among the keywords used for search in the Internet some were identical or 
similar to some well-established marks of others differing from the advertisers. The owner 
of the Community trade mark LV and Luis Vuitton sued Google for infringement committed 
by the use of such keywords.
The French Supreme Court requested the Court of Justice EU to render preliminary 
ruling on the question whether the use of a mark as a keyword in the Internet can constitute 
trade mark infringement.
In his very extensive judgement the Court of Justice EU said inter alia:
…In those circumstances, the use by the third party of the sign identical with the mark 
as a keyword triggering the display of that advertisement is liable to create the 
impression that there is a material link in the course of trade between the goods or 
services in question and the proprietor of the trade mark (see, by way of analogy case 
206/01 Arsenal Football Club, para 56,20 and Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch para 60 
– para 85 of the GOOGLE judgement)
Comments
The referred ARSENAL judgement was made in view of the request of the High Court of 
Justice (U.K.) relating to the interpretation of the TM Directive, the BUDWEISER-
Anheuser Busch judgement was rendered in view of the request of the Supreme Court of 
Finland in respect of the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. As a result, applying 
analogy, referring to these cases seems to me convincing though the application of the 
solution referred could also be called as “precedent”.
4. .eu Top Level Domain21
Domain names have some similar features as trademarks; one legal dispute referred to the 
Court of Justice EU also concentrated on a confl ict between a trademark and a domain 
name. The referral, by the Austrian Supreme Court, was for interpretation of the Regulation 
874/2004/EC and not the TM Directive.
It is remarkable that in examining characteristics of bad faith in this dispute, in the 
judgement assessed (para 71) the large number of generic domain name applications as 
relevant evidence of bad faith “in the light of the objective of Regulation No. 874/2004 to 
prevent or avoid speculative or abusive registrations or uses of domain names. In that regard 
19 C-236-238/08: Bonet, G.: Publicité sur Internet et renforcement selon la Cour de Justice: 
contrefaçon de marque ou directive No 2000/36/CE. Communication-Commerce Electrique – Revue 
Mensuelle LexisNexis JC., Juin 2010.
20 C-206/01; inter alia Vida: ECJ Judgement on the Pharmacist’s Scale: Arsenal Case. Ingenieur 
Conseil 2005, 95.
21 C-569/08 – In my opinion the judgement can be considered also as an example of teleological 
interpretation. See: Vida: Teleological Interpretation in the Case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. GRUR Int. 2003, 106.
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it is apparent from the order of reference that the appellant in the main proceedings lodged 
180 such applications.”
Though this case is only “neighbouring” to trademark cases, it is worth noting that the 
Court of Justice EU referred in it as follows:
The issue of whether an applicant is acting in bad faith must be the subject of an 
 overall assessment, taking into account all the factors relevant to the particular case 
(see, by way of analogy, Case C-529/07 Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli – para 
42 of the .eu Top Level judgement).
… the presentation of the mark at issue may also be relevant in determining whether 
there is bad faith within the meaning of Article 21(1)(b) of Regulation No 874/2004 
(see, by way of analogy Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli – para 49 of the .eu Top 
Level judgement).
Comments
Though the domain name Regulation 874/2004/EC provides on bad faith, as there is no 
case law in respect of domain names especially relating to bad faith, the Court of Justice 
EU held it for useful to refer to trademark case law by analogy. I think this is the most 
speaking example in respect of applying analogy from one legal fi eld to another.
5. Analogy or Precedent?
In the case law of the Court of Justice EU there are of course further judgements in which 
reference is made to analogies. From the trademark world let me quote the DIOR case,22 in 
which the French licensee sold products under the DIOR mark to a discount store. In the 
judgement it was said:
… where a licensee sells goods to a discount store in contravention of a provision in 
the licence agreement, a balance must be struck between, on the hand, the legitimate 
interest of the proprietor of the trade mark covered by the licence agreement in being 
protected against a discount store which does not form part of the selective distribution 
network using that trade mark for commercial purposes in a manner which could 
damage the reputation of that trade mark and, on the other hand, the discount store’s 
legitimate interest in being able to resell the goods in question by using methods which 
are customary in its sector of trade (see, by analogy, case Parfums Christian Dior, 
para 44 – para 56 of the DIOR judgement).
The legal situation was similar in the case CÉLINE23 and in the case IP 
TRANSLATOR.24 Namely, the referred judgements were rendered on the basis of requests 
22 C-59/08; Bretonniere, J. P.: Marques de prestige: une protection renforcée par la CJCE. 
Revue Lamy, 2009, août-septembre, 23.
23 C-17/06, para 17, in which analogy to the ARSENAL case (para 40) and the OPEL case (para 
18) are referred.
24 C-307/10 para 45, in which analogy to the PRAKTIKER case (paras 49–51) is referred.
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of the Courts in France, resp., in the United Kingdom, relating to national marks, in respect 
of interpretation of the rules of the TM Directive.
As a result, like the above-reported paragraphs of the case OMEL v ONEL paragraphs 
54 and 55, or in the case PAGO paragraphs 22–25, 27 analogy is referred to similar previous 
cases.
In German, Hungarian, Czech etc. laws references of this kind are considered mostly 
as precedents and not as analogies.
It is interesting to note that the term “analogy” can be found only in the French and 
English texts of the judgements, but not in the German ones.
The differences in translation are probably not simply result of translators’ leisureliness, 
but the inherent cause of it may be a different concept of analogy in the French and English 
doctrine and the German one.
6. The notion of analogy in different regimes
In the French Legal Dictionary we can read:
reasoning with analogy:25 A classic legal interpretation method which is based on 
interpreting the text. Its essence is to extend the ruling presented in a text to a case of a 
similar nature, even if the latter is not specifi ed in the text in question, and to show that the 
reason for applying the rule is identical in the two cases. This is demonstrated if, by the 
ratio legis, the similarity of the two cases is determinant for applying the rule.
In Garner’s English-American Dictionary we can read:
analogy; analog(ue):26 An analogy is a corresponding similarity or likeness; in logic, 
analogy means “an inference that, if two or more things are similar in some respects, they 
must be alike in others.”
An analogue is a thing that is analogous to something else. For example “The Esso 
decision suggests that analogues to such traditional equity doctrines as laches, election of 
remedies, and estoppels may justify a fi nding of peculiar circumstances.” (The spelling 
analog should be confi ned to technical contexts involving physics or computers.)
And at last two German Legal Dictionaries:
In Brockhaus27 we can read:
Analogy, is reasonable application of a legal provision not regulated by statutory law, 
to a similar situation. As a result, this is not an interpretation, but fi lling of a gap of the 
statutory law…
25 Vocabulaire Juridique, Paris, 2001.
  *raisonnement par analogie: Procédé classique d’*interpretation rationnelle, relevant de la 
methode* exégétique qui consiste à étendre la solution édictée par un texte pour un cas à un cas 
semblable non prévu par le texte, en montrant que la raison d’appliquer la règle a démontré lorsque, 
dans la ratio legis, ce en quoi les cas sont semblables est determinant pour l’application de la règle.
26 Garner, B. A. (ed.): Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage. 2nd ed., New York–Oxford, 1995.
27 Der Brockhaus Recht: Mannheim–Leipzig, 2002.
  Excerpt:
  Analogie, sinngemässe Anwendung eines Rechtssatzes auf einen vom Gesetz nicht geltenden, 
aber ähnlichen Tatbestand. Analogie ist also nicht Gesetzauslegung, sondern Füllung einer Lücke des 
Gesetzes.
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In the Lexicon of Law28 we can read:
Analogy, is the due equalization of two different situations. As a result, analogy is 
possibly relating to another situation if there is a gap in the Act…
Comparing the French and English defi nitions with the German ones it is outstanding 
that the fi rst ones follow a more general concept of the notion “analogy” than the German 
ones. Let us call the French and English ones using a Latin term (as it is common even 
today in Hungarian law) analogia iuris.
The German defi nitions of the notion analogy are more restrictive, they require a gap 
in the statutory law, moreover, as it stands in the Brockhaus defi nition, the method is not an 
interpretation (contrary to the French defi nition). This kind of analogy is called in Hungarian 
law analogia legis.
To be precise, the distinction between analogia iuris and analogia legis is not a 
specialty of Hungarian law, it has its origin probably in medieval pandects. This supposition 
can be sustained by the fact, that in German law we can fi nd this distinction even today, 
though the Latin terms are replaced by German ones (Rechtsanalogie, Gesetzesanalogie).29
The different concept of the same notion is therefore only refl ected in translations of 
the same judgements it is not a hit of German translators. In this respect I refer to the 
observation of Urban30 and Király,31 who state that “professional translators of European 
law can only aim for an approximate equivalence” (and not for a perfect identity).
My fi rst conclusion is therefore that the notion of analogy is understood differently by 
lawyers of these three Member States.
It can give comfort to the reader that the use of analogies or precedents serves the 
principle of consequentiality, which is one of the main postulates of legal technique in the 
culture of modern formal law.32
Concluding observations
As I can see from Hungarian perspective (a French or British lawyer could have perhaps a 
different view), in respect of the references to analogies, in my view, the above-reported 
judgments can be classifi ed in three types. Namely
1. Analogy (true)
Applying in a domain name case, trademark case law. Example: .eu top level paras 
42, 49.
2. Precedent I. (rather than analogy)
28 Tilch, H. (ed.): Deutsches Rechts-Lexikon. 2nd ed, München, 1992.
  Excerpt:
  Analogie ist die rechtsfolgemässige Gleichsetzung zweier unterschiedlichen Tatbestände… 
Analogie ist möglich, wenn eine Lücke des Gesetzes hinsichtlich eines anderen Tatbestandes 
vorliegt…
29 Weber, K. (ed.): Rechtswörterbuch. 20th ed., München, 2011; historically see Schröder, J.: 
Recht als Wissenschaft (Law as Science). 2nd ed., München, 2012. 383.
30 Urban, N.: One legal language and the maintenance of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
Florence, Manuscript, 4.
31 Király, M.: Bábel virágzása és hanyatlása: Az Európai Közösség jogának hatása a nyelvekre 
(Rise and Fall of Babel: The Impact of Law of the EU on Languages). In: Liber Amicorum Gy. Boytha 
dedicata. Budapest, 2004. 196.
32 Varga, Cs.: The Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 2012. 381.
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Applying relating to Community trade mark cases, national trademark case law (as 
ruled in the TM Directive). Examples: OMEL/ONEL paras 54, 55; PAGO paras 22–25, 27, 
GOOGLE para 85.
3. Precedent II. (pure precedent or pseudo-analogy)
Applying related to national trade marks, case law for national trade marks is applied 
(as ruled in the TM Directive); or relating to Community trade marks, Community trade 
mark (as ruled in the TM Regulation). Examples: DIOR para 56, CÉLINE para 17, IP 
TRANSLATOR para 45, OMEL v ONEL paras 30–31.
I repeat once again that the above classifi cation is made from the perspective of a 
Hungarian lawyer, but I know that there are lawyers in Germany, too, who sometimes are 
surprised reading French or English texts of judgements like those reported hereover, 
referring to analogy.
An other observation: it would be desirable that – in cases where it is justifi ed as 
explained in points 1 and 2 – the term “analogy” would be used in translations into all 
languages. I think if laws of the Member States are harmonised, notions and terms ought to 
be used identically, too, when one speak about Community trade mark law.
